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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE 0? UTAH

ROCK MANOR TRUST,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Case No. 143^2

vs.
STATE ROAD COMMISSION OF UTAH,
Defendant-Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
Plaintiff is the owner of a sign and structure situated
easterly from the frontage road abutting Interstate 15 in the
vicinity of Farmington, Utah.

The sign was a lawful nonconform-

ing use at the time of a fire which damaged the supporting
structure.

Defendant ordered removal of the renovated sign.
1
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

The lower court sustained the desicion of the defendant
commission, first by memorandum decision stating:
- 1 -

TT

The court having heretofore taken this matter
under advisement, rules that the sign is a
rebuilt sign and must come downTT.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the decision of the lower

court and the defendant commission, sustaining the right of
plaintiff to maintain the sign as a continuing nonconforming
use.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
No additional testimony was adduced in the District
Court and the matter was considered by the court upon the transcript forwarded to the court by the defendant pursuant to the
provisions of Title 27, Chapter 12, Section 1369, Utah Code
Annotated 1953 as amended in 1971, which provides for a review
by the court to determine from the records, exhibits and transcripts forwarded if the commission1s decision is supported by
substantial evidence.
The facts were largely undisputed except as to the
extent of damage caused by the fire.
The sign in question is located about a mile south of
Farmington, Utah, easterly from the 1-15 frontage road.

The

structure upon which the sign is located was constructed in
trapezoidel shape by permit issued November 17, 1959, as a dual
purpose building to serve as a barn and as a base for signs which
applicant anticipated would be allowed by subsequent zoning amendment.

Davis County amended its ordinance in 1963 to allow
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advertising signs in this agricultural zone and issued Permit
No. 19^, July 12, 1965, after which signs were painted on the
north, west and south sides of the structure (Transcript 40).
The Utah Outdoor Advertising Act 27-12-136.1 et ff. became
effective in May 1967, and thereafter the county zoning as to
signs in this area became ineffective.

In September 1972,

(although the commission findings state that the fire occurred
in September 1971 and a new building permit was issued in October
1971, the evidence is undisputed that the year was 1972, Tr. 3
and exhibits, and defendant's counsel acknowledges this error),
the structure was damaged by fire but the extent of the damage
was disputed.

Mr. Smith for theState estimated two-thirds

destruction (Tr. 22) but he admitted that he never saw the
structure after the fire and before it was circumscribed by
another face (Tr. 30-31); did not take the pictures offered in
evidence nor crawl inside where the physical inspection could be
made (Tr. 23); admitted that all the metal siding which was
attached to the original structure is still on location except a
little on the north side (Tr. 30); did not see or inspect the
west side of the original structure (Tr. 30); and he could not
tell as to the present state of the metal on the original structure
as to whether it fell in or was pounded in to accommodate the new
facing (Tr. 31). In contrast, there was testimony for the plaintiff
that the fire caused the structure to lean at the southeast corner
and more so at the northeast corner, but that the front west was
intact (Tr. 41); that the original structure could have been
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repaired by bracing but to make a better looking job it was
decided to utilize new facing materials; that the metal on the
old structure was pounded down to accommodate bracing the new
structure; that at the present time the entire west front is
still intact for inspection; and that the old structure was not
removed in order to preserve the evidence (Tr. 42).
The new structure was constructed in October 1972 and
the sign matter placed thereon does not utilize as much space
as the former sign (Tr. 44)•
Formal Findings of Fact were signed by the court
(R 29 and 30) which are as follows:
Findings of Fact
Tr

l. The subject sign belonging to the plaintiff,
is located on the east side of Interstate Highway 1-15,
visible to the traveling public at milepost 35$-7$ in
Davis County, Utah.
2. The original sign was in existence prior to
the effective date of the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act
as set forth in Chapter Twelve (12) Title Twenty-seven
(27), Utah Session Laws of 1967.
3. The original sign prior to September or
October, 1970, enjoyed a nonconforming use status.
4. Sometime in September or October of 1970,
a fire substantially destroyed the original sign.
5. The plaintiff applied to the local authority
for permission to build a TTbarnn in October of 1970
where the remains of the old burnt-out structure stood.
6. The ?rbarnrr was rebuilt around the periphery
of the remains of the old burnt-out structure, using
some of the old structure for support.
7. In May, 1971, the plaintiff painted the
advertising copy of the current structure and was cited
by the State pursuant to Section 27-12-136.9 for
erecting and maintaining an illegal sign.
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$. On a requested hearing by the plaintiff,
the State Road Commission of Utah made and entered
Findings of Fact and Conclusions and rendered its
decision that the subject sign was and is illegal
and that it must be removed within 30 days unless
appeal be taken.TT
The court in its Conclusions of Law stated in part:
!T

2. The nonconforming sign use ceased to exist
at the time the original sign was substantially
destroyed by fire in September or October of 1970.TT
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THERE WAS NO LAW ORREGULATION IN EXISTENCE AT THE
TIME OF THE FIRE WHICH DECLARED THAT DAMAGE BY FIRE
TERMINATES THE NONCONFORMING RIGHT TO THE SIGN AND
THE RIGHT TO RECONSTRUCT SAME.
Notice of violation was dated May S, 1973, hence we
review the laws in existence prior thereto.

27-12-136.7, Utah

Code Annotated as amended 1967, 1971, provides in the last
paragraph thereof as follows:
"Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this
section, the commission shall issue permits and identification tags, upon application and payment of the
requisite fee for any sign lawfully in existence on the
day prior to the effective date of this act, and the
permits shall thereafter be renewed for such period
of time as is prescribed in Section 27-12-136.10 unless
the structure is removed for improper maintenance as
defined by commission regulation. Permits shall be
obtained prior to the beginning of construction of any
sign. Signs lawfully in place on the effective date
of this act shall have permits."
27-12-136.6 provides:
n

The commission is hereby authorized to make and
promulgate regulations to control the erection and
maintenance of outdoor advertising signs, displays
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and devices along the interstate and primary
highway systems in conformance with this act
and in conformity with the agreement ratified and
approved by this actTT.
27-12-136.3(10)B defines:
TT

The word 'maintenancer means to repair,
refurbish, repaint or otherwise keep an existing
sign structure in a state suitable for use."
On many occasions, as revealed by the transcript,
plaintiff requested defendant to supply any regulations or laws
which would justify their order of removal, but the only regulation supplied was one issued after July 9, 1973, by the Federal
Government indicating that the states are to establish criteria,
and "exceptions may be made for the rebuilding or re-erecting
signs which have been vandalized or subject to some other criminal
or tortious act, if permitted by the state law and re-erected in
kind", (Tr. Summation page 5)• Swenson vs. Salt Lake City,
16 U2d 231, 39S P2d #79 (1965) held that a zoning ordinance must
be pleaded and proved and is not subject to judicial notice and
that a zoning ordinance does not operate retrospectively against
existing nonconforming buildings or uses where vested rights are
concerned.
Apparently no state or Federal law, regulation or
criteria existed prior to July 9, 1973, which would govern reerection of signs or termination of non-conforming uses.

At the

hearing reference was made to Davis County zoning ordinances over
objections that they were not properly pleaded or proved, but the
ordinance, Chapter 7, Section 7-6(2) supports the plaintiff, and
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a copy of the relevant part thereof is in the record (R 26), and
in substance it states that a nonconforming use may continue
after destruction by fire if restoration is started within a
period of one year and diligently pursued.

The Findings state

that the fire occurred in September or October 1970, but transcript clearly shows the mistake in that it occurred in September
1972 and counsel admitted this error before the court and is
expected to admit this on appeal.

A building permit issued

October 11, 1972 and the sign was completed in May 1973An extensive annotation relative to repair of nonconforming structures after damage or destruction by fire or
other casualty is contained in 57 ALR 3rd 419 et ff.

At page

427 the text states:
Tt

. . . . although it is usually stated that a
nonconforming structure or a structure devoted to a
nonconforming use may be repaired or rebuilt after
damage thereto or the destruction thereof by fire or
other casualty, unless there is some restriction in
the applicable zoning measure to the contrary. Thus,
where such restriction is repealed, the effect of the
repeal is to allow restoration of a damaged nonconforming structure".
In the instant case no restriction on repair or
rebuilding existed, and the reconstruction was proper.
Also in Id ALR 2nd at page 754, it is stated that
involuntary'destruction of the nonconforming use does not constitute abandonment and the owner is entitled to replace the
destroyed structure.
Again in $7 ALR 2nd 104 it is stated:
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Tr

In absence of any prohibitory provision, a nonconforming structure, or a structure devoted to a
nonconforming use may be repaired or rebuilt after
damage thereto or the destruction thereof by fire
or other casualty".
The State Road Commission is created by statute and
can only exercise those powers granted by the legislature
(Interwest Corp. vs. Public Service Commission, 29 U2nd 3$0,
510 P2d 919) • There are no statutes authorizing the State Road
Commission to define or delimit nonconforming uses, nor had the
commission created any such regulation.
POINT II.
THIS COURT HAS RECOGNIZED THE COMPENSABLE PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND THE RIGHT OF RELOCATION OF A NONCONFORMING SIGN.
Related questions were decided by this court in
National Advertising Co. vs. Utah State Road Commission, 26 U2d
132, 4$6 P2d 3$3 (1971), where the company had an old sign near
the freeway which could no longer be seen, and it discussed with
the defendant the change of size, height, location and direction.
A new permit was issued by the commission for the same size as
the old sign, but the company erected a considerably larger sign
35 feet north of the old sign and left both signs standing for
about 60 days which caused friction with the commission representative who gave notice and ordered the new sign to be taken down.
On appeal to the District Court, the commission was prohibited
from removing the new sign.

The trial court found that the

company as lessee of the site had property rights and outdoor
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advertising privileges on the property in question and that the
new sign was a continuation of the existence of the outdoor
advertising and property rights of the plaintiff with the knowledge,
consent and permit of the commission.

On appeal this court held

there was believable evidence "that the plaintiff had established
a nonconforming use of an advertising sign visible to the traveling public at that location; that in order to continue its use
effectively there had to be some substantial changes for which
permission of the defendant was sought; that the changes were
made substantially within the purview of the negotiations of the
parties with either the consent or at least without serious
objection from the Road Commission until the new sign was
completely

constructed; and there has been no procedure by the

commission to remove the sign and pay just compensation therefor
as provided in the Highway Beautification Act".
The significant elements of the National Advertising
case as it relates to the instant case are:
(1) A nonconforming use was recognized as a compensable property right.
(2)

There was voluntary removal of the old sign.

(3)

If the Road Commission had authority to allow a

new sign, larger and in a new location, to be built to allow
realistic use of the outdoor advertising rights of a nonconforming sign, in that case, then it has a duty to be similarly
reasonable and realistic in allowing repair or reconstruction

-
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of an involuntarily damaged sign.
(4)

Compensable property rights exist apart from the

physical sign in that this court held that National should be
paid compensation for the removal of the new sign which rights
stemmed from the old sign.
POINT III.
IT IS A DENIAL OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS TO DEPRIVE
PLAINTIFF OF THE RIGHT TO MAINTAIN ITS SIGN WHERE NO
LAW OF THE LAND DECLARED THE LOSS OF THE RIGHT BY
INVOLUNTARY DESTRUCTION OF THE PHYSICAL SIGN.
The concept of due process of law has a dual aspect,
substantive and procedural,

(16 AmJur 2nd 941)•

In the instant case, the procedural due process has
been recognized and largely followed.
process has been ignored.

However, substantive due

As stated in 16 Am. Jur. 2nd 946:

TT

Substantive due process may be roughly defined as
the constitutional guaranty that no person shall
be deprived of his life, liberty or property for
arbitrary reasons* such a deprivation being constitutionally supportable only if the conduct from
which the deprivation flows is proscribed by
reasonable legislation. . . reasonably applied . . .TT.

No statutory law or other law existed as of the date of the fire
which stated that a nonconforming use is lost by involuntary
destruction as by loss through fire and the defendant is without
authority to assume that the fire in fact terminated the nonconforming use.

Any action upon such assumption is arbitrary,

unreasonable and an attempt to legislate and impose ex post facto
regulations in violation of due process of law.
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CONCLUSION
In absence of any regulation prohibiting re-erection
of the nonconforming sign after involuntary damage by fire, the
Court should reverse the decision of the lower court and the
defendant commission.
Respectfully submitted,

George K.'Fade!
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
170 West Fourth South
Bountiful, Utah 3^010
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